Browse Topic: Safety regulations and standards
The Primary Author has been involved in Army Aviation Development and Acquisition since the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS), Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH), Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP), and Light Helicopter Experimental (LHX) Programs in the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. The first three of these programs successfully made it to production aircraft, while the LHX became the RAH-66 Comanche and was canceled primarily due to technical problems and cost overruns. The initiation of the next phase by the Army Aviation Development (ADD) Directorate for Future Vertical Lift (FVL) did not occur until the beginning of the 2015-2000 timeframe. This was 35 years since the last Army Aviation Development in 1980. To help sustain this FVL development, the Primary Author led, oversaw, and helped conduct a program through the National Rotorcraft Technology Center (NRTC) in the 2015-2016 timeframe. It was called the Development Assurance Value-Based Acquisition (DAVBA
To this point in aviation history, a typical aircraft type certification program has focused on the constituent systems that make up the aircraft, decomposing them further and further down until reaching their elemental parts and how they interact. This approach has traditionally treated the actual communication technology as only an interface, with technology and implementation based on a decision between multiple stakeholders via an ICD and high-level requirements. This has been necessary to ensure the accurate and on-time delivery of safety-critical data between nodes. When using legacy point-to-point or bus-based data communication technologies like ARINC 429 or MIL-STD-1553, this approach has worked well enough as these technologies are relatively straightforward and proven technologies. However, as onboard bandwidth needs for safety-critical data increase, these legacy technologies are increasingly no longer capable of meeting the needs of system integrators. Ubiquitous, high
Adaptive cruise control (ACC) is an enhancement of conventional cruise control systems that allows the ACC-equipped vehicle to follow a forward vehicle at a pre-selected time gap, up to a driver selected speed, by controlling the engine, power train, and/or service brakes. This SAE Standard focuses on specifying the minimum requirements for ACC system operating characteristics and elements of the user interface. This document applies to original equipment and aftermarket ACC systems for passenger vehicles (including motorcycles). This document does not apply to heavy vehicles (GVWR > 10,000 lbs. or 4,536 kg). Furthermore, this document does not address other variations on ACC, such as “stop & go” ACC, that can bring the equipped vehicle to a stop and reaccelerate. Future revisions of this document should consider enhanced versions of ACC, as well as the integration of ACC with Forward Vehicle Collision Warning Systems (FVCWS).
This SAE Recommended Practice provides common data output formats and definitions for a variety of data elements that may be useful for analyzing the performance of automated driving system (ADS) during an event that meets the trigger threshold criteria specified in this document. The document is intended to govern data element definitions, to provide a minimum data element set, and to specify a common ADS data logger record format as applicable for motor vehicle applications. Automated driving systems (ADSs) perform the complete dynamic driving task (DDT) while engaged. In the absence of a human “driver,” the ADS itself could be the only witness of a collision event. As such, a definition of the ADS data recording is necessary in order to standardize information available to the accident reconstructionist. For this purpose, the data elements defined herein supplement the SAE J1698-1 defined EDR in order to facilitate the determination of the background and events leading up to a
This document provides nomenclature and references to related documents for heavy vehicle event data recorders (HVEDR) for heavy-duty (HD) ground wheeled vehicles. The SAE J2728 series of documents consists of the following:
In the early days of quality management, prior to 1980s, the focus seemed to be on "Quality Control" or "Quality Assurance". Emphasis was placed on inspection and testing. Quality was about conformance to specification. Non-Conformance Reports were representative of quality control. Our understanding of quality management has evolved, largely based on the Toyota Quality and Concurrent Engineering Approach of moving it off the production line for Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) [1]. In the late 1980s industry experienced similar difficulties in understanding and adopting quality management. The ideas behind managing quality are quite abstract. Quality is primarily about understanding and satisfying a customer's expectations. This includes implicit expectations, as well as explicit expectations. The techniques of specification, inspection and testing only make sense in that wider context. Formal risk management was developed in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s
Australia has embarked on an extraordinary reform to design, develop and implement a new and contemporary Defence Aviation Safety Framework. The program seeks to establish a single Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) and issue a comprehensive and integrated suite of Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) for initial and continuing airworthiness, flight operations, air navigation, aerodromes (inclusive of ship-borne heliports) and safety management systems. While reforms of this scale can often be triggered by reviews into major aircraft accidents, such as The Nimrod Review by Charles Haddon-Cave QC in October 2009, Australia initiated the reform when new aircraft fleets were being introduced and at a time of arguably high-levels of aviation safety. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explain the compelling reason for change; providing a twenty-five-year retrospective analysis of Australia’s previous Defence aviation safety framework to give a rich picture of the
This SAE Standard provides test procedures for air and air-over-hydraulic disc or drum brakes used for on-highway commercial vehicles over 4536 kg (10000 pounds) GVWR. This recommended practice includes the pass/fail criteria of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. TP-121D-01.
This SAE standard specifies a message set, and its data frames and data elements, for use by applications that use vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications systems. While the data dictionary was originally designed for use over DSRC, this document is intended to be independent of the underlying communications protocols used to exchange data between participants in V2X applications.
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