Browse Topic: Safety management systems

Items (31)
This standard includes ISO 9001:20152 quality management system requirements and specifies additional aviation, space, and defense industry requirements, definitions, and notes. It is emphasized that the requirements specified in this standard are complementary (not alternative) to customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. If there is a conflict between the requirements of this standard and customer or applicable statutory or regulatory requirements, the latter shall take precedence. This International Standard specifies requirements for a quality management system when an organization: a needs to demonstrate its ability to consistently provide products and services that meet customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, and b aims to enhance customer satisfaction through the effective application of the system, including processes for improvement of the system and the assurance of conformity to customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. All the requirements of this International Standard are generic and are intended to be applicable to any organization, regardless of its type or size, or the products and services it provides. NOTE 1: In this International Standard, the terms “product” or “service” only apply to products and services intended for, or required by, a customer. NOTE 2: Statutory and regulatory requirements can be expressed as legal requirements.
G-14 Americas Aerospace Quality Standards Committee (AAQSC)
This document establishes the general requirements for the quality management of aircraft ground deicing/anti-icing systems and processes. It covers the areas of: Quality system, documentation, and control of records; Management responsibility; Resource management; Product realization; and Measurement, analysis, and improvement. This document defines these areas and their key aspects so they can be practically managed, and that deicing operations can become safer with time. In alignment with AS6285 and AS6286, the primary focus of this standard is on the deicing/anti-icing of aircraft using deicing and anti-icing fluids.
G-12T Training and Quality Programs Committee
Australia has embarked on an extraordinary reform to design, develop and implement a new and contemporary Defence Aviation Safety Framework. The program seeks to establish a single Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) and issue a comprehensive and integrated suite of Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) for initial and continuing airworthiness, flight operations, air navigation, aerodromes (inclusive of ship-borne heliports) and safety management systems. While reforms of this scale can often be triggered by reviews into major aircraft accidents, such as The Nimrod Review by Charles Haddon-Cave QC in October 2009, Australia initiated the reform when new aircraft fleets were being introduced and at a time of arguably high-levels of aviation safety. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explain the compelling reason for change; providing a twenty-five-year retrospective analysis of Australia’s previous Defence aviation safety framework to give a rich picture of the difficulties faced by increased commercialization from the late 1990s, globalization in the 2000s, and the recent emergence of strict work, health and safety legislation in Australia.
Hood, JamesMarzocca, PierSinha, Arvind
This document establishes the minimum training and qualification requirements for ground-based aircraft deicing/anti-icing methods and procedures. All guidelines referred to herein are applicable only in conjunction with the applicable documents. Due to aerodynamic and other concerns, the application of deicing/anti-icing fluids shall be carried out in compliance with engine and aircraft manufacturers’ recommendations. The scope of training should be adjusted according to local demands. There are a wide variety of winter seasons and differences of the involvement between deicing operators, and therefore the level and length of training should be adjusted accordingly. However, the minimum level of training shall be covered in all cases. As a rule of thumb, the amount of time spent in practical training should equal or exceed the amount of time spent in classroom training.
G-12T Training and Quality Programs Committee
This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) provides guidelines for the effective operation and use of fire containment covers (FCCs). Technical Standard Orders (TSOs) C203 and C90e (and later revisions) incorporate AS6453, and provide the Minimum Performance Standards (MPS) for an FCC design. The net and pallet used with the FCC must be approved using the updated net and flammability requirements in TSO C90e and later revisions. However, fire containment performance also requires this equipment is properly used. Fire safety is compromised when FCCs are used in an inadequate manner.
AGE-2 Air Cargo
Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial ServiceARP5151A (Current)8/20/2019
This document describes a process that may be used to perform the ongoing safety assessment for (1) GAR aircraft and components (hereafter, aircraft), and (2) commercial operators of GAR aircraft. The process described herein is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is to help a company establish and meet its own internal standards. The process described herein identifies a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess continuing airworthiness. Ongoing safety management is an activity dedicated to assuring that risk is identified and properly eliminated or controlled. The safety management process includes both safety assessment and economic decision-making. While economic decision-making (factors related to scheduling, parts, and cost) is an integral part of the safety management process, this document addresses only the ongoing safety assessment process. This ongoing safety assessment process includes safety problem identification and corrective action, tracking of problems, the application of “lessons learned” to improve the efficiency of the process, and reduction of the time to achieve corrective action in the field. ARP5150 is the recommended practice for the safety assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service. ARP5151 is the recommended practice for the safety assessment process for GAR aircraft in commercial services. While the processes are similar, their implementations are different due to operations, data availability, and sizes of individual operations.
S-18C ARP5150A and ARP5151A Working Group
A New Vision for Development Assurance Guidance2017-01-20579/19/2017
In the last several years, technical advances and regulatory pressures have motivated the need for flexible, simple, and performance-based solutions for conducting development assurance in support of a system safety assessment process. Additionally, the affected design space for commercial vehicles has been growing beyond the conventional regulations for airplanes, rotorcraft, engines, and propellers, addressed by current Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARPs). This space is beginning to include commercial technologies such as unmanned aerial systems, multi-stage spacecraft systems, and road-able aircraft. These developing areas are each accompanied with their own development assurance expectations in support of their safety criteria. Concurrently, the industry and regulators are working to simplify guidance for system safety and development assurance, which has been foundational in the aircraft industry for decades. From the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 reorganization to the Streamlining Assurance Process Workshops, the existing regulations and guidance are under pressure to adjust to new expectations within these technical areas. There are several challenges with the existing development assurance guidance which complicates both its application to these new technical areas and its alignment with these streamlining expectations. These challenges include application to programs with a combination of new and legacy systems and ARP alignment with regulations and other guidance. Meeting these challenges requires a shift from overly prescriptive and complex guidance to a proposal which provide clear expectations towards planning for, assessing, and achieving objectives that align with regulations. This work seeks to capture the fundamental objectives of development assurance, to promote balanced application and the flexibility of methods that may be applied to them in a changing environment. It proposes a single Aerospace Standards which will address these issues, while still permitting the continued use of ARPs as guidance.
Voros, Robert E.Merdgen, DavidWallington, Andrew
ABSTRACT Safety Management Systems (SMS) are mainly based on an operational feedback approach for continuous safety enhancement. Closed loop approaches have been dramatically developed and applied in aeronautics by control engineers. In this article, SMS is redefined in terms of automatic control and this analogy leads to the identification of three classical feedback strategies. The theoretical effect of these strategies on performances is also discussed. As in any closed loop systems, the importance of understanding how the mission stakeholders react will be found to be particularly crucial. The last aspect of this analogy is discussed through quantitative SMS, or the standard use of SMS indicators. Several aspects of decision making and quantitative analysis are then discussed.
Girondin, VictorMorel, Stephane
ABSTRACT Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) can be a central and effective component of an operator's safety management strategy. By capturing and processing operational information from aircraft flight data, the operator/owner can identify safety hazards, facilitate monitoring and assessment of the interaction between the pilot and the aircraft, initiate remedial actions, and support continuous improvement of the safety management system. The Robust HFDM system described in this paper also provides improved results via automation of data download and reporting. Automation is achieved by formalizing the concept of a flight operation, adding exceedance reporting, and improving the HFDM architectural design to allow for the transfer of data to secure ground based storage. In the extreme, robust HFDM also provides protection of data in the event of a mishap event that would usually only be available via post incident analysis of a crash survivable memory. This paper discusses the formalized concept of a flight operation, how regime recognition has been tailored to support the more robust application, and finally the addition of exceedance monitoring. The changes in architecture, processing and data transfer, result in a new and more robust HFDM system.
Bechhoefer, EricAugustin, Michael
While helicopters are used for a myriad of purposes in rural and urban environments, their true potential can be measured by the support they can offer in extreme and remote areas. This paper describes a Northern Canadian operator, Universal Helicopters Newfoundland and Labrador LP, the equipment used, the tasks performed, the working conditions and the risks and challenges faced . The principal areas of operation include the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Ungava Peninsula and Canada's high and eastern Arctic. The company operates 19 light and intermediate helicopters in one of the most challenging environments in the world. The aircraft are equipped with operational equipment and accessories for operation in temperature extremes which test not only the machinery but the crews that fly and maintain them. A Safety Management System is in place to properly identify and manage the unique risks of operating in the north as well as logistical support that recognizes associated added costs. The presence of multiple aircraft and their adjacency to remote communities often results in requests from authorities to assist in Search and Rescue operations. Despite challenges from wildlife, weather, topography and a long distance supply and communications chains, operators are able to conduct helicopter operations to support scientific research and natural resource development.
Goodyear, Geoff
The Evolution of Airline Safety and Security Programs2013-01-22299/17/2013
Career paths are not something that one can predict. They are as much about being in the right spot at the right time with the desired skill set as they are about having a detailed, calculated plan. How does one go from being a young Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) test engineer to being an airline Senior Vice President of Safety, Security and Compliance and the joint industry/FAA co-chair of the Commercial Aviation Safety Team? It is a bit unusual that a non-pilot ends up on an airline Operations Specification listed as the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 119 Director of Safety for one of the largest airlines in the world. Engineering background and experience were key stepping stones on that journey along with a healthy dose of skepticism. An initial assignment to make an airline's safety program robust, credible and data driven, much like the very successful aircraft reliability programs, set the direction and path forward. Today's commercial airline safety and security programs incorporate sophisticated hazard identification and risk mitigation processes taking advantage of millions of data points painstakingly reviewed for hints of emerging issues and trends. Working with just one airline's data is no longer sufficient. Broader industry analysis is required utilizing experience and information from airline partners, both domestic and international, as well as the wealth of public information available, from government radar surveillance data to social media.
Hylander, Kenneth J.
Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial ServiceARP5151 (Historical)5/9/2013
This document describes a process that may be used to perform the ongoing safety assessment for (1) GAR aircraft and components (hereafter, aircraft), and (2) commercial operators of GAR aircraft. The process described herein is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is to help a company establish and meet its own internal standards. The process described herein identifies a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess continuing airworthiness. Ongoing safety management is an activity dedicated to assuring that risk is identified and properly eliminated or controlled. The safety management process includes both safety assessment and economic decision-making. While economic decision-making (factors related to scheduling, parts, and cost) is an integral part of the safety management process, this document addresses only the Ongoing Safety Assessment Process. This Ongoing Safety Assessment Process includes safety problem identification and corrective action, tracking of problems, the application of “Lessons Learned” to improve the efficiency of the process, and reduction of the time to achieve corrective action in the field. ARP5150 is the standard for the safety assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service. ARP5151 specifies the safety assessment process for GAR aircraft in Commercial Services. While the processes are similar, their implementations are different due to operations, data availability, and sizes of individual operations.
S-18C ARP5150A and ARP5151A Working Group
Will the Real Solution Please Stand Up2009-01-310611/10/2009
This technical paper and presentation addresses the need for more refined, pervasive and highly engaged technical leadership in the system safety discipline. Systems engineering disciplines have been led to believe that by following a single industry standard, generic plans, inflexible processes, proven methods and techniques a system with low safety risk will evolve with little rework. The truth is there is no prescriptive one size fits all approach, or a convention that will anticipate and cover all needs. In several domain areas, especially modern military and commercial airborne systems, diverse technology and functionality have been evolving with such high complexity and criticality that collective processes will not work unless seasoned leaders allow creativity and innovation to be part of the safety culture. Leaders must have intuitive engineering and operations judgment to determine how to best allocate effective resources to meet system safety goals and objectives. This means allowing the safety culture to evolve to the point where system safety engineers are empowered to seek performance based and functional solutions and inclusion of the human systems integration domain in error reductions, rather than following outdated hazard based models designed for federated systems before automation, high complexity and safety criticality was controlled by software and collaborative and highly integrated systems.
Hendrix, Barry
Integrated Safety Management System2009-01-317111/10/2009
The Safety Management System requires a structured Risk Management Process to be effective. In the technical fields where numerous potentially catastrophic risks exist, processes and procedures need to account not only for the hardware random failures but also of human errors. The technology has progressed to the point where the predominant safety risks are not so much the machine failures but that of the human interaction. Accidents are rarely the result of a single cause but of a number of latent contributing factors that when combined result in the accident. In the Aerospace industry, the operational risk to the fleet is assessed by the manufacturer and the operator independently and is used in safety and/or regulatory decision-making. For the manufacturer, the risk assessment is a philosophy whereby risk of a potential or actual occurrence is evaluated in comparison to the event analyzed in the system safety assessment or structural analysis performed for certification of the product. The resulting safety decision-making process involves integration of the probabilistic risk assessment, deterministic and severity perception elements such that the decisions made leads to corrective or preventative actions. The evaluations of the human factors elements are subjectively assessed based on individual experience based criteria and are difficult to integrate into the safety decision. The risk assessment is viewed as the process that records all these factors as the basis for the safety decision and prioritization of the corrective actions. In the Nuclear industry a risk-informed approach to safety and/or regulatory decision-making represents a philosophy whereby risk insights are considered together with other factors, including good engineering practice and experience, to establish the design requirements and operational issues commensurate with their importance to public health and safety. A standard risk-based approach to safety and/or regulatory decision-making is one in which a decision is based solely on the numerical results of a risk assessment. Quantitative risk analyses are important inputs to decision making, but they do not constitute an adequate or sufficient base of information for addressing the complex issues that face the nuclear power industry. For that reason such analyses are only one of the many contributing inputs to a comprehensive risk-informed decision making process. Risk-informed decision making involves integration of probabilistic, deterministic and non-quantifiable elements such that, overall, the decisions made lead to a resolution of the issue being considered that is commensurate with its risk-significance and is better to that likely to be reached if any approach is used in isolation. This paper intends to compare the Risk Management methodologies and procedures used in the Aerospace and Nuclear industries to highlight similarities and differences. The learning from these differences may then identify potential improvements to either methodology.
Kavoliunas, MichaelKlim, Zdzislaw H.Komljenovic, Dragan
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