Browse Topic: Safety management systems
ABSTRACT
Australia has embarked on an extraordinary reform to design, develop and implement a new and contemporary Defence Aviation Safety Framework. The program seeks to establish a single Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) and issue a comprehensive and integrated suite of Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) for initial and continuing airworthiness, flight operations, air navigation, aerodromes (inclusive of ship-borne heliports) and safety management systems. While reforms of this scale can often be triggered by reviews into major aircraft accidents, such as The Nimrod Review by Charles Haddon-Cave QC in October 2009, Australia initiated the reform when new aircraft fleets were being introduced and at a time of arguably high-levels of aviation safety. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explain the compelling reason for change; providing a twenty-five-year retrospective analysis of Australia’s previous Defence aviation safety framework to give a rich picture of the
Unsettled Topics in Automated Vehicle Data Sharing for Verification and Validation Purposes discusses the unsettled issue of sharing the terabytes of driving data generated by Automated Vehicles (AVs) on a daily basis. Perception engineers use these large datasets to analyze and model the automated driving systems (ADS) that will eventually be integrated into future “self-driving” vehicles. However, the current industry practices of collecting data by driving on public roads to understand real-world scenarios is not practical and will be unlikely to lead to safe deployment of this technology anytime soon. Estimates show that it could take 400 years for a fleet of 100 AVs to drive enough miles to prove that they are as safe as human drivers.Yet, data-sharing can be developed – as a technology, culture, and business – and allow for rapid generation and testing of the billions of possible scenarios that are needed to prove practicality and safety of an ADS – resulting in lower research
ABSTRACT Safety Management Systems (SMS) are mainly based on an operational feedback approach for continuous safety enhancement. Closed loop approaches have been dramatically developed and applied in aeronautics by control engineers. In this article, SMS is redefined in terms of automatic control and this analogy leads to the identification of three classical feedback strategies. The theoretical effect of these strategies on performances is also discussed. As in any closed loop systems, the importance of understanding how the mission stakeholders react will be found to be particularly crucial. The last aspect of this analogy is discussed through quantitative SMS, or the standard use of SMS indicators. Several aspects of decision making and quantitative analysis are then discussed.
ABSTRACT Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) can be a central and effective component of an operator's safety management strategy. By capturing and processing operational information from aircraft flight data, the operator/owner can identify safety hazards, facilitate monitoring and assessment of the interaction between the pilot and the aircraft, initiate remedial actions, and support continuous improvement of the safety management system. The Robust HFDM system described in this paper also provides improved results via automation of data download and reporting. Automation is achieved by formalizing the concept of a flight operation, adding exceedance reporting, and improving the HFDM architectural design to allow for the transfer of data to secure ground based storage. In the extreme, robust HFDM also provides protection of data in the event of a mishap event that would usually only be available via post incident analysis of a crash survivable memory. This paper discusses the
While helicopters are used for a myriad of purposes in rural and urban environments, their true potential can be measured by the support they can offer in extreme and remote areas. This paper describes a Northern Canadian operator, Universal Helicopters Newfoundland and Labrador LP, the equipment used, the tasks performed, the working conditions and the risks and challenges faced . The principal areas of operation include the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Ungava Peninsula and Canada's high and eastern Arctic. The company operates 19 light and intermediate helicopters in one of the most challenging environments in the world. The aircraft are equipped with operational equipment and accessories for operation in temperature extremes which test not only the machinery but the crews that fly and maintain them. A Safety Management System is in place to properly identify and manage the unique risks of operating in the north as well as logistical support that recognizes associated
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