Browse Topic: Vehicle networking
This document covers the requirements for SAE implementations based on ISO 17987:2016. Requirements stated in this document will provide a minimum standard level of performance to which all compatible ECUs and media shall be designed. This will assure full serial data communication among all connected devices regardless of supplier.The goal of SAE J2602-1 is to improve the interoperability and interchangeability of LIN devices within a network by adding additional requirements that are not present in ISO 17987:2016 (e.g., fault tolerant operation, network topology, etc.).The intended audience includes, but is not limited to, ECU suppliers, LIN controller suppliers, LIN transceiver suppliers, component release engineers, and vehicle system engineers.The term “master” has been replaced by “commander” and term “slave” with “responder” in the following sections.
The importance of in-vehicle network security has increased with an increase in automated and connected vehicles. Hence, many attacks and countermeasures have been proposed to secure the controller area network (CAN), which is an existent in-vehicle network protocol. At the same time, new protocols-such as FlexRay and Ethernet-which are faster and more reliable than CAN have also been proposed. European OEMs have adopted FlexRay as a control network that can perform the fundamental functions of a vehicle. However, there are few studies regarding FlexRay security. In particular, studies on attacks against FlexRay are limited to theoretical studies or simulation-based experiments. Hence, the vulnerability of FlexRay is unclear. Understanding this vulnerability is necessary for the application of countermeasures and improving the security of future vehicles.In this article, we highlight the vulnerability of FlexRay found in the experiments conducted on a real FlexRay network. Consequently
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