Browse Topic: Cybersecurity

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Security in Avionics SystemsF-0080-2024-10615/7/2024
There is a shift in the industry driving avionics manufactures to provide more interactive connectivity than they have had to in the past. The increasing threat of cyber security attacks in our communication systems is an increasing problem in our society and the avionics industry cannot ignore the fact that the threats are real and they must protect the systems from these attacks. Another element driving these concerns is the implementation of the FAA's NextGen or EASA's SESAR technologies which will require avionics vendors to replace their proprietary, relatively isolated embedded computer systems with information systems that interoperate and share data throughout FAA's/EASA's operations. In order to make the National Airspace (NAS) operate in the most efficient way all aircraft and ground systems will need to share information. The FAA and EASA have released standards to address these systems. This paper is only going to address aspects of security from a software perspective; more specifically, what an operating system and its environment should provide as a foundation for the security requirements. It is important to note that a generic solution to any security problem does not exist. Providing a complete security solution is the result of going through and addressing the airworthiness security process (AWSP).
Gilliland, Gary
Test Preprint 20220628 By Madhukar DongariSAE-PP-025996/28/2022
Test Preprint 20220628 By Madhukar Dongari
Mutagaana, Festo
Attacking vehicles with ransomware: Watch the horizon2022-01-04413/29/2022
Ransomware use is rampant throughout most industries. With the number of successful ransomware attacks through the industrial economy, this feels like a tsunami of attacks. These attacks seemingly originate from anywhere with an internet connection. There are vast numbers of bad actors creating these attacks, all focused on your systems. With the large number of attacks, it is granted there have been many breaches. While there have been a large number of successful attacks, each attack’s objectives have varied. These have historically been to generate revenue in the form of fees for the decrypt key or a promise not to publish exfiltrated data. The landscape has become saturated with ransomware attacks on consumers and the enterprise. There has been extensive training for staff in an effort to mitigate these issues. The next potential targets are vehicles and ground systems. These, as targets, have not been evaluated via a full risk assessment to the recommended extent. While not widely exploited, this has the distinct potential to be a significant issue. With the criticality of these systems for the troops along with the DoD, the risk for nation-state attacks cannot be dismissed or ignored. The impact of a coordinated attack would be significant. As the vehicles increase their connectivity and level of autonomy, the risks continue to grow. The compromised ground vehicle systems may lead to the vehicles inoperable, the supply chain stopping to the soldiers in the field, and distribution systems (goods and soldiers) ceasing. The paper will analyze ransomware threats, creation, pivots from present attacks, and attack methodologies.
Parker, Charles
testing tasks 2 jms test citSAE-PP-004629/28/2021
2 go
SintzADMIN, Jeneane, SintzUSER, Jeneane
Road Vehicles - Cybersecurity EngineeringISO/SAE21434 (Current)8/31/2021
This document specifies engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding concept, product development, production, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of electrical and electronic (E/E) systems in road vehicles, including their components and interfaces. A framework is defined that includes requirements for cybersecurity processes and a common language for communicating and managing cybersecurity risk. This document is applicable to series production road vehicle E/E systems, including their components and interfaces, whose development or modification began after the publication of this document. This document does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity.
Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee
Automated Driving System Data LoggerJ3197_202107 (Current)7/23/2021
This SAE Recommended Practice provides common data output formats and definitions for a variety of data elements that may be useful for analyzing the performance of automated driving system (ADS) during an event that meets the trigger threshold criteria specified in this document. The document is intended to govern data element definitions, to provide a minimum data element set, and to specify a common ADS data logger record format as applicable for motor vehicle applications. Automated driving systems (ADSs) perform the complete dynamic driving task (DDT) while engaged. In the absence of a human “driver,” the ADS itself could be the only witness of a collision event. As such, a definition of the ADS data recording is necessary in order to standardize information available to the accident reconstructionist. For this purpose, the data elements defined herein supplement the SAE J1698-1 defined EDR in order to facilitate the determination of the background and events leading up to a collision in an ADS-operated vehicle. The data elements defined in this document are unique to Level 3, 4, or 5 ADS features, as defined by SAE J3016, and provide additional background of the events leading up to a crash or crash-like event. The data from sensors such as camera(s), LiDAR(s) etc. will provide information in the absence of a human driver. The data included in the ADS data logger is expected to be used in conjunction with the SAE J1698 event data recorder (EDR) record and traditional accident reconstruction analysis. The EDR and ADS data logger will capture information leading up to the triggered event, at a minimum. There are no facts to support that recording data for greater than 5 seconds pre-event would change the outcome of any crash analysis. Thus, the recommended recording duration for a data logger is 5 seconds pre-event, same as an EDR. Due to the potential for sensor and/or communication failure during a crash event, the recommendation is that data should be collected post-crash for impact and rollover sensors for up to 250 ms. ADS technology is still being developed and is not yet commercially deployed. Therefore, this SAE Recommended Practice is intended as a guide toward standard practice and is subject to change to keep pace with experience and technical advances.
Event Data Recorder Committee
Protecting Patients and Their Data from Cyberattacks Aimed at Their Connected Health DevicesTBMG-373578/1/2020
The security of connected health technology is often assumed to exist when it does not, or considered to be prohibitively expensive or complex, or, worst of all, relegated to an afterthought. This is dangerous thinking, especially as the industry increasingly moves to a smartphone-based command-and-control model for these safety-critical applications.
MEDIA INDEPENDENT SECURE OFFBOARD NETWORKARINC848 (Current)6/19/2020
ARINC Specification 848 is a functional standard based on a protocol specification profile for a secured network interface. The purpose is to define a common method of initiating a mutually authenticated tunnel between an aircraft service and its Enterprise service. ARINC Specification 848 defines a standard implementation for securing the communications between an onboard Local Area Network (LAN) and an Enterprise LAN on the ground. Various aircraft network architectures and various air to ground communication channels (aka media) are accommodated in this document. For example, L-band Satellite Communication (Satcom), Ku/Ka-band Satcom, Gatelink Cellular, and Gatelink are considered.
Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee
Selftrust - A Practical Approach for Trust Establishment2020-01-07204/14/2020
In recent years, with increase in external connectivity (V2X, telematics, mobile projection, BYOD) the automobile is becoming a target of cyberattacks and intrusions. Any such intrusion reduces customer trust in connected cars and negatively impacts brand image (like the recent Jeep Cherokee hack). To protect against intrusion, several mechanisms are available. These range from a simple secure CAN to a specialized symbiote defense software. A few systems (e.g. V2X) implement detection of an intrusion (defined as a misbehaving entity). However, most of the mechanisms require a system-wide change which adds to the cost and negatively impacts the performance. In this paper, we are proposing a practical and scalable approach to intrusion detection. Some benefits of our approach include use of existing security mechanisms such as TrustZone® and watermarking with little or no impact on cost and performance. In addition, our approach is scalable and does not require any system-wide changes. To detect intrusions, we propose a combination of TrustZone® secure space approach along with a mechanism of static and dynamic watermarks. The current scope of research is restricted to architectures which provide a secure space to execute software. The research is an enhancement over the current TrustZone® implementation for device control post intrusion. In conclusion, the proposed approach is a simple and scalable mechanism for detection and control of intrusion.
Abhyankar, Ranjit Vinayak, A, Sreenath
Challenges in Integrating Cybersecurity into Existing Development Processes2020-01-01444/14/2020
For an established development process and a team accustomed to this process, adding cybersecurity features to the product initially means inconvenience and reduced productivity without perceivable benefits. Adapting development processes to take cybersecurity into account introduces challenges not present in engineering divisions so far. Strategies designed to deal with these challenges differ in the way in which added duties are assigned and cybersecurity topics are integrated into the already existing process steps. Cybersecurity requirements often clash with existing system requirements or established development methods, leading to low acceptance among developers, and introducing the need to have clear policies on how friction between cybersecurity and other fields is handled. A cybersecurity development approach is frequently perceived as introducing impediments, that bear the risk of cybersecurity measures receiving a lower priority to reduce inconvenience. Moreover, this leads to frustration among cybersecurity developers when their proposals are not accepted, and they feel their work is not appreciated. On the other hand, putting too much emphasis on cybersecurity leads to feature creep and makes the development unnecessarily complicated without producing appropriate results. It seems natural to orientate oneself by how safety topics are handled in the development process and adjust this to accommodate cybersecurity. It is, however, not clear in which way these added responsibilities should be assigned, as conflicts of interest occur when a single person must additionally take cybersecurity goals into account, which might be clashing with other project goals this person is responsible for. Ideally, cybersecurity aspects are considered and integrated into development processes not only to fulfill customer and legal requirements, but also to enable developers of functionalities not directly related to cybersecurity to produce better and more robust results as shortcuts are no longer easily possible.
Lenhart, Patric, Arndt, Paul, von Wedel, Jana, Beul, Christian, Weldert, Jan
Android Defense in Depth Strategy in an Automobile Ecosystem2020-01-13654/14/2020
Android is becoming an environment of choice in the automotive sector because of near production grade open source stack availability and large developer community. With growing interest from Automotive OEMs for Android IVI (In-Vehicle Infotainment) solutions, we predict a similar growth trend in an automobile like in Mobile space. At another end, the need for more interconnected devices within the Automobile ecosystem is increasing, which leads to an increased threat to security. In sophisticated device interconnections, identifying the gateways and implementing the right security strategy is key to improve overall system security & stability. While Android is maturing for automotive and with growing interest from automotive OEMs, we spent time in analyzing current Android defense-in-depth concepts with the automotive perspective. The main aim of this paper is to examine the current defense-in-depth strategies available in Android and propose additional measures to meet automotive needs. This paper shall aid OEM’s to consider proposed strategies for their Android IVI solutions for increased security & safety.
Achuthan, Balasubramanian, Chandupatla, Srinivas, Yerram, Nalinikanth
Secure Vehicular Communication Using Blockchain Technology2020-01-07224/14/2020
The cars we drive are rapidly transforming. Connected vehicles in the context of the Advanced Driver Assistance System or Autonomous Vehicles are about to change the way we drive cars. Connected Vehicles are futuristic vehicles that can interact with other vehicles for passing on information such as, mapping and localization, information about road traffic and driving behaviour. However, such vehicles, particularly the autonomous ones, are prone to a variety of attacks including cyber-attacks. These malicious attacks can intrude a vehicle that not only endangers the vehicles safety, but also the life of passengers and the nearby environment. Thus, identifying and eliminating these attacks for providing a secure communication environment is of great need. Also, all the existing methods for vehicular communication rely on a centralized server which itself invite massive cyber-security threats. These threats and challenges can be addressed by using the Blockchain (BC) technology, where each transaction is logged in a decentralized immutable BC ledger. In this work, we show how BC can facilitate communication between connected vehicles to send and receive information while assuring the security of all the vehicles participating in the BC network. First, we developed an application for the blockchain based less-complex Proof-of-Work consensus method that allows the vehicles to transfer information in a secured manner. Second, we demonstrate the working of the application using raspberry pi board that act as vehicles mounted with sensors and two computers that act as blockchain network. Finally, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of blockchain based vehicular communication and the integration of the blockchain with VANET as well.
M, Vidya Krishnan, Koduri, Rajesh, Nandyala, Sivaprasad, Manalikandy, Mithun
Automated Driving System Data LoggerJ3197_202004 (Historical)4/11/2020
This recommended practice provides common data output formats and definitions for a variety of data elements that may be useful for analyzing the performance of automated driving system (ADS) during an event that meets the trigger threshold criteria specified in this document. The document is intended to govern data element definitions, to provide a minimum data element set, and to specify a common ADS data logger record format as applicable for motor vehicle applications. The data elements defined in this document are unique to Levels 3, 4, or 5 ADS features, as defined by SAE J3016, and provide additional background of the events leading up to a crash or crash-like event. The data from sensors such as camera(s), LiDAR(s) etc. will provide information in the absence of a human driver. The data included in the ADS data logger is expected to be used in conjunction with the SAE J1698 EDR record and traditional accident reconstruction analysis. The event data recorder (EDR) and ADS data logger will capture information leading up to the triggered event, at a minimum. ADS technology is still being developed and is not yet commercially deployed. Therefore, this SAE Recommended Practice is intended as a guide toward standard practice and is subject to change to keep pace with experience and technical advances.
Event Data Recorder Committee
Permanently or Semi-Permanently Installed Diagnostic Communication Devices, Security GuidelinesJ3005-2_202003 (Current)3/4/2020
The scope of the document is to define the cyber-security best practices to reduce interference with normal vehicle operation, or to minimize risk as to unauthorized access of the vehicle's control, diagnostic, or data storage system; access by equipment (i.e., permanently or semi-permanently installed diagnostic communication device, also known as dongle, etc.) which is either permanently or semi-permanently connected to the vehicle's OBD diagnostic connector, either SAE J1939-13, SAE J1962, or other future protocol; or hardwired directly to the in-vehicle network. This document only specifies requirements and guidance for those diagnostic communication devices and not for the vehicle. Refer to SAE J3138 for requirements for the vehicle side.
Vehicle E E System Diagnostic Standards Committee
SAE STANDARDS NEWS20AUTP03_063/1/2020
SAE International and ISO, the International Organization for Standardization, announced in February 2020 the joint publication of a draft of a new Standard to address automotive cybersecurity engineering. The standard, ISO/SAE 21434, is designed to help industry define a structured process to ensure cybersecurity is incorporated into the design of road vehicles, including their components, subsystems, software and connections to external devices and networks. The project marks the first major collaboration between the two standards development organizations (SDOs). For this effort, SAE and ISO assembled a joint working group of more than 100 experts from 14 nations and 82 industry organizations across public, private and government sectors. SAE's Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee and the ISO Technical Committee 22, Sub-committee 32 and Working Group 11 were heavily involved throughout development.
Leading Women in Engineering & Science: Mahsa Nakhjiri, Senior Director of Technical Product Management, FlexTBMG-362473/1/2020
Road Vehicles - Cybersecurity EngineeringISO/SAE DIS 21434 (Historical)2/12/2020
This document is an unapproved DRAFT of a proposed SAE International Standard. Consequently, this document is subject to change and cannot be utilized for any conformance or compliance purposes. This document specifies requirements for cybersecurity risk management regarding engineering for concept, development, production, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning for road vehicle electrical and electronic (E/E) systems, including their components and interfaces. A framework is defined that includes requirements for cybersecurity processes and a common language for communicating and managing cybersecurity risk. This document is applicable to series production road vehicle E/E systems, including their components and interfaces whose development or modification began after the publication of the document. This document does not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity.
Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee
Service Specific Permissions and Security Guidelines for Connected Vehicle ApplicationsJ2945/5_202002 (Current)2/5/2020
SAE is developing a number of standards, including the SAE J2945/x and SAE J3161/x series, that specify a set of applications using message sets from the SAE J2735 data dictionary. (“Application” is used here to mean “a collection of activities including interactions between different entities in the service of a collection of related goals and associated with a given IEEE Provider Service Identifier (PSID)”). Authenticity and integrity of the communications for these applications are ensured using digital signatures and IEEE 1609.2 digital certificates, which also indicate the permissions of the senders using Provider Service Identifiers (PSIDs) and Service Specific Permissions (SSPs). The PSID is a globally unique identifier associated with an application specification that unambiguously describes how to build interoperable instances of that application. If the application features multiple activities such that different activities have different security impacts, correspond to different roles, or require different capabilities, then the application specifier should define an SSP data structure such that the contents of the SSP in a given certificate indicate which activities the certificate holder is entitled to carry out. This document establishes a security systems engineering process that can be used by future application specifiers to (1) determine which fields and activities should be subject to SSP constraints, and (2) specify a syntax and semantics for the SSPs for that application. It also addresses the development of SSPs for scenarios not addressed in the original application specification; for example, arising from regional extensions, changes in application functionality, or future expansions of the base SAE J2735 standard.
V2X Security Technical Committee
Cellular-key solution augments commercial-vehicle security20TOFHP02_082/1/2020
Connectivity's many benefits are matched by security concerns, which has prompted a number of security specialists from many fields to focus their attention on commercial vehicles. Irdeto, which provides security tools and services to disparate industries, is addressing commercial vehicles with cell phone-based keyless entry technology and cybersecurity services. The company, founded in 1969, lists diverse firms like Charter Communications, Comcast, 20th Century Fox and Alibaba Cloud as customers. As OEMs ramped up their connectivity offerings, Irdeto established its Connected Transport division in 2016. That division addresses overall cybersecurity while also offering a keyless entry system, Keystone, that uses cell phones to give users more control over vehicle access.
Costlow, Terry
The Impact of Cyber Cameras on the Intelligence CommunityTBMG-360652/1/2020
The global arena has become a surveillance state as public spaces are littered with surveillance cameras and individuals are consumed with personal electronic devices, most of which have embedded cameras. The number of security surveillance systems has increased primarily for criminal deterrence and to assist law enforcement agencies.
The Role of Sensors in the Evolution of RoboticsTBMG-3560912/1/2019
At one time, robotics was considered more science fiction than reality. That's changing. Today, robots are increasingly playing a role in our everyday lives. They're zooming around our homes to pick up dust, helping surgeons perform operations with even more precision, sniffing out suspicious packages for law enforcement, and on the factory floor, they're performing all kinds of tasks for automotive, electronics, and industrial manufacturing companies.
How Augmented Reality Can Modernize Aerospace And Defense ManufacturingTBMG-3568512/1/2019
You've probably heard about augmented reality (AR) in the context of consumer entertainment: video gaming, virtual tours, or interactive displays. But AR for enterprise business is here. It's no longer an emerging technology, or a novelty; businesses are using AR to overhaul processes, drive efficiencies, reduce manufacturing errors, and improve their bottom line.
V2X Standardization in Over-the-Air Solution2019-28-243511/21/2019
Today in-vehicle software is growing significantly resulting into increase in importance of over-the-air software/firmware updates dramatically. Various suppliers are providing the update-over-the-air solution in the automotive sector. Due to limited standardization in solution, each supplier needs more customization for specific customer. This paper is to bring in the required standardization in V2X resulting into ‘vehicle on-board components’ as one solution to multiple customer. “Update over-the-air improved solution through various standardization resulting into ‘vehicle on-board components’ as the product”
Kumaraswamy, Pavithra
Data Privacy in the Emerging Connected Mobility Services: Architecture, Use Cases, Privacy Risks, and Countermeasures11-02-01-000410/14/2019
The rapid development of connected and automated vehicle technologies together with cloud-based mobility services is transforming the transportation industry. As a result, huge amounts of consumer data are being collected and utilized to provide personalized mobility services. Using big data poses serious challenges to data privacy. To that end, the risks of privacy leakage are amplified by data aggregations from multiple sources and exchanging data with third-party service providers, in face of the recent advances in data analytics. This article provides a review of the connected vehicle landscape from case studies, system characteristics, and dataflows. It also identifies potential challenges and countermeasures.
Li, Huaxin, Ma, Di, Medjahed, Brahim, Kim, Yu Seung, Mitra, Pramita
Data Security ServicesJ1760_201910 (Current)10/9/2019
The scope of this SAE Recommended Practice is to require the use of the same Security Services as defined by the International Standard ISO/CD 15764, modified by the Class of Security as determined by the resource provider and referenced in Table 1, Extended Data Link Security References.
Motor Vehicle Council
Maintaining Data Protection and Security for the Connected CarTBMG-3527110/1/2019
The connected car has already become a reality. It is a subject not just electrifying customers and manufacturers but also security researchers and IT experts. And in a worst-case scenario, criminal hackers as well. For years, security experts have observed the fact that the desktop PC is not the only target of digital attacks anymore. A large part of the malware is now customized to hit mobile devices. It would be negligent to believe that this development would leave the connected car unmolested.
Defeating Commercial Drone Threats with Open-Source SDR19AERP10_0610/1/2019
With the emergence of highly capable, low-cost, wirelessly controlled drones, bad actors can easily execute disruptive operations. Such incidents have created a need for drone defense systems that rapidly evolve with ever-increasing threat frequency and sophistication. It's nearly impossible to look at technology news without seeing an article about drones. Whether detailing how Amazon wants to use drones to deliver packages or revealing amazing aerial video of drones following Olympic snowboarders, commercial drones are ubiquitous. Drone emergence has benefited many applications including sports broadcasting and wildlife preservation wilderness surveys. Offering powerful, intelligent software, drones are becoming less expensive and easier to use, with substantial operating range. As with any disruptive technology, drone operation often attracts bad actors looking to exploit the capability for less-than-noble objectives. Some reports have shown unmanned commercial drones being used for unwanted surveillance and even disrupting commercial airspace, as recently seen in the United Kingdom.
BlackBerry Tech Duo Sees Emergence of Vehicle-based Platforms19AVEP09_079/1/2019
Though likely to provide the OS of autonomy, BlackBerry also anticipates a larger shift to automobiles as software platforms. At 2019's TU Automotive conference, Autonomous Vehicle Engineering spoke with two of the industry's most important software sages, BlackBerry's John Wall and Kaivan Karimi, both senior vice presidents and co-heads of Blackberry Technology Solutions. The duo's division includes BlackBerry's security services, the nigh ubiquitous QNX architecture along with products including Jarvis, Certicom and Paratek for the Waterloo, Ontario-based company. Sort of like chatting with the Obi-Wan and Yoda of secure-software architectures, the interview provided an animated back-and-forth between the two well-acquainted BlackBerry execs, discussing the emergence of the vehicle as its own software platform.
Seredynski, Paul
Autonomy in Your Face19AVEP09_049/1/2019
Biometric technology is deemed essential to ensuring AV driving safety and advancing the user experience-if privacy issues don't derail its deployment. Research into potential automotive applications for biometrics-facial and retina scans or fingerprints-is increasing, despite rising concerns about privacy and data security, and outcries from civil liberties advocates. A growing number of OEMs, Tier 1s and startups are striving to add facial recognition capability to driver monitoring systems (DMS). Interior cameras are becoming commonplace as DMS are needed for advanced safety systems and autonomous driving. Biometrics are being added to provide more functionality, though suppliers must deal with the privacy issues that surround these technologies.
Costlow, Terry
Editorial19AVEP09_019/1/2019
Although editor-in-chief Lindsay Brooke's cover story detailing the foundations of Israel's surging tech sector helps to explain the nation's expanding expertise in all things cyber-secure, much of this issue deals with security and privacy of another kind-the access we grant almost daily to all manner of digital “providers” of goods and services. The access we'll be expected to cede is in exchange for some of the promising new features of the looming connected-vehicle future.
Visnic, Bill
Executive Forum: Sensors & the IoTTBMG-351449/1/2019
No longer just a buzzword, the Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly taking hold in many different industries, from aerospace and automotive, to medical and manufacturing. The IoT ecosystem incorporates Web-enabled smart devices that use processors, sensors, communication hardware, and software to collect, send, and act on data they acquire. Tech Briefs posed questions to executives in the sensors and IoT component industries for their views on issues concerning the role of the IoT in manufacturing.
Facility Focus: Georgia Tech Research InstituteTBMG-351429/1/2019
The Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) is the nonprofit applied research division of the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) in Atlanta, GA. Founded in 1934 as the Engineering Experiment Station, GTRI supports eight laboratories in more than 20 locations around the country and performs more than $370 million of research annually for government and industry.
The Navigator19AVEP09_029/1/2019
No trust in AI systems without data protection When people surround themselves with microphones and cameras, others will be listening and watching. This reality shouldn't come as a surprise, but remarkably it does. The advent of automated driving will dramatically expand this activity. In fact, it is already creating controversy. At its core is the challenge of training so-called artificial intelligence systems. As human children, we learn in large part through the guidance we get from parents, teachers and other caregivers. AI systems are no different. They ingest data and “learn” from it. But just as children must be shown the difference between red and green, a circle and a square, or A and Z, machine learning systems need data that has been labeled.
Technology Produces Unclonable Digital Fingerprints for Internet of Things DevicesTBMG-349328/1/2019
Researchers have created technology that is 10 times more reliable than current methods of producing unclonable digital fingerprints that can be used to authenticate devices linked to the Internet of Things (IoT).
Hands-on Cybersecurity Studies: Multi-Perspective Analysis of the WannaCry RansomwareTBMG-348648/1/2019
Ransomware is malware that obstructs a user from accessing digital assets through various mechanisms. These assets are held hostage and inaccessible until the user pays a ransom. In most cases, this is accomplished using encryption where, once the malicious program executes, it will target and encrypt certain files and will release the decryption key at the time of payment. Some ransomware instances target only certain common user-generated files such as media and documents. In this case, system files and others required for the operating system to function correctly (user authentication, process execution, etc.) are unaffected. Others encrypt much more and seek to lock out entire systems.
E/E Data Link SecurityJ2186_201907 (Current)7/12/2019
This SAE Recommended Practice establishes a uniform practice for protecting vehicle components from "unauthorized" access through a vehicle data link connector (DLC). The document defines a security system for motor vehicle and tool manufacturers. It will provide flexibility to tailor systems to the security needs of the vehicle manufacturer. The vehicle modules addressed are those that are capable of having solid state memory contents accessed or altered through the data link connector. Improper memory content alteration could potentially damage the electronics or other vehicle modules; risk the vehicle compliance to government legislated requirements; or risk the vehicle manufacturer's security interests. This document does not imply that other security measures are not required nor possible.
Vehicle E E System Diagnostic Standards Committee
Accelerated Secure Boot for Real-Time Embedded Safety Systems11-02-01-00037/8/2019
Secure boot is a fundamental security primitive for establishing trust in computer systems. For real-time safety applications, the time taken to perform the boot measurement conflicts with the need for near instant availability. To speed up the boot measurement while establishing an acceptable degree of trust, we propose a dual-phase secure boot algorithm that balances the strong requirement for data tamper detection with the strong requirement for real-time availability. A probabilistic boot measurement is executed in the first phase to allow the system to be quickly booted. This is followed by a full boot measurement to verify the first-phase results and generate the new sampled space for the next boot cycle. The dual-phase approach allows the system to be operational within a fraction of the time needed for a full boot measurement while producing a high detection probability of data tampering. We propose two efficient schemes of the dual-phase approach along with calibratable parameters to achieve the desired tamper detection probability. We evaluate the tampering detection accuracy within a simulation environment. Then we build a real system to evaluate the real-time performance using an automotive embedded microcontroller with a built-in Hardware Security Module (HSM).
Nasser, Ahmad M.K., Gumise, Wonder, Ma, Di
Connectivity Solutions for AVs19AVEP07_047/1/2019
The promises of fully connected autonomous vehicles are great, but so are the challenges. The synergies between electrification, connectivity and automation in future vehicles are creating new business models and causing developments in each to be accelerated. EVs, for example, need connectivity to assist with finding charging stations and autonomous vehicles (AVs) require significant levels of electric power to support their compute demands. But perhaps the greatest synergy lies between connectivity and autonomy. Most AV developers, particularly for mainstream applications, want to minimize reliance on V2X connectivity because it might introduce interoperability requirements and a need for standards that may slow down deployment and eliminate competitive advantage. In general, increased connectivity creates cybersecurity risks and latency, coverage and bandwidth issues. Despite these drawbacks, there is broad agreement that AVs need connectivity for up-to-date high-resolution maps as road conditions and landmarks can change due to construction, for example.
Borroni-Bird, Chris
What M&E Can Teach the AV Industry About Data19AVEP07_057/1/2019
Media & entertainment offers important learnings on data retention, management, scalability and security. At first glance, autonomous vehicles would seem to have little in common with the Media and Entertainment (M&E) industry, beyond action-movie car chases and in-vehicle entertainment screens. But AVs and M&E do have a lot in common when it comes to their data. Both generate hundreds of petabytes of data per year. Both need to manage that data for retrieval and value and both need to store that data with security and protection.
Coari, Jason, Pastor, Mark
5G Cellular-Enabled Test Infrastructure for AVs Launched at Millbrook19AVEP07_117/1/2019
Autonomous-vehicle 5G development support moves ahead at Millbrook Proving Ground in the U.K. Millbrook Proving Ground in the U.K. has officially launched the AutoAir consortium's 5G cellular testing infrastructure for autonomous vehicle (AV) development. The new facility at Millbrook provides AV developers access to a low-latency, wide-area wireless infrastructure billed to work seamlessly across the entire sprawling test facility 50 miles (80 km) north of London. According to the facility, the 5G capability “is crucial for the validation and testing of SAE Level 3 to Level 5 autonomous vehicles, which require high-speed real-time connectivity to compare real-world outcomes with decision-making simulation.”
Birch, Stuart
Q&A: Power Anomalies Detect Malware in Embedded SystemsTBMG-347307/1/2019
Aydin Aysu, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor in the Electrical & Computer Engineering Department at North Carolina State University in Raleigh, where he helped develop a technique for detecting micro-architecture malware that uses a system’s architecture to thwart traditional security measures.
Etching of Fluoropolymer InsulationsARP6167 (Current)6/11/2019
This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) describes the etching of fluoropolymer electrical wire insulations to ensure that all facets of the process from the chemistry to the processing, to the storage and handling are well defined.
AE-8A Elec Wiring and Fiber Optic Interconnect Sys Install
The FACE™ of Military ModernizationTBMG-345286/1/2019
U.S. rival countries have been rapidly modernizing their militaries, with publicized advances that pose credible challenges to U.S. supremacy in all aspects of warfare: air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. On January 19, 2018 Secretary Mattis discussed the National Defense Strategy and emphasized the need to modernize key capabilities to address these threats. He stated: “To keep pace with our times, the department will transition to a culture of performance and affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. Success does not go to the country that develops a new technology first, but rather, to the one that better integrates it and more swiftly adapts its way of fighting. Our current bureaucratic processes are insufficiently responsive to the department's needs for new equipment. We will prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation and frequent modular upgrades.”
Requirements Document for Sensor/Video Interconnect Subsystems with RationaleAIR4911A (Current)5/14/2019
The purpose of this document is to establish the requirements for sensor/video interconnect subsystems. These requirements have been driven predominantly, but not exclusively, by aerospace-type military platforms and commercial aircraft. These requirements are intended to be used as the criteria to establish a sensor/video interconnection standard that will foster the development of common hardware to simplify the total interconnectivity of future avionics platforms.
AS-1C Avionic Subsystems Committee
UAV Ground Control StationTBMG-343285/1/2019
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. San Diego, CA 858-762-6700
Trust-Based Control and Scheduling for UGV Platoon under Cyber Attacks2019-01-10774/2/2019
Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) may encounter difficulties accommodating environmental uncertainties and system degradations during harsh conditions. However, human experience and onboard intelligence can may help mitigate such cases. Unfortunately, human operators have cognition limits when directly supervising multiple UGVs. Ideally, an automated decision aid can be designed that empowers the human operator to supervise the UGVs. In this paper, we consider a connected UGV platoon under cyber attacks that may disrupt safety and degrade performance. An observer-based resilient control strategy is designed to mitigate the effects of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) cyber attacks. In addition, each UGV generates both internal and external evaluations based on the platoons performance metrics. A cloud-based trust-based information management system collects these evaluations to detect abnormal UGV platoon behaviors. To deal with inaccurate information due to a V2C cyber attack, a RoboTrust algorithm is designed to analyze vehicle trustworthiness and eliminate information with low credit. Finally, a human operator scheduling algorithm is proposed when the number of abnormal UGVs exceeds the limit of what human operators can handle concurrently. Representative simulation results demonstrate that the proposed automated decision aid can effectively guide human operators when working with platoons under cyber attacks. The platoon survivability has been improved by the proposed algorithm when compared to those that operate without this system.
Li, Fangjian, Mikulski, Dariusz, Wagner, John R., Wang, Yue
SAE STANDARDS NEWS19AUTP04_074/1/2019
SAE's Global Ground Vehicle Standards (GVS) staff and committee members have a busy schedule lined up for this year's SAE World Congress Experience (WCX) in Detroit. The GVS team will meet and work on activities that include advanced technologies of automated driver-assistance systems (ADAS), autonomous vehicles, shared mobility, V2X, cyber security, and human factors, in addition to dozens of “traditional” subject areas. The GVS staff is implementing new methods to expedite the standards development process for these increasingly complex engineering systems and rapid technology advancements, without violating fundamental rules of a consensus-based open process needed to ensure stakeholder participation and adoption. Visit sae.org for more details.
Shuttleworth, Jennifer
Using Common WiFi to Detect Weapons, Bombs, and Chemicals in BagsTBMG-341474/1/2019
Ordinary WiFi can easily detect weapons, bombs, and explosive chemicals in bags at museums, stadiums, theme parks, schools, and other public venues using a low-cost suspicious object detection system that is easy to set up, reduces security screening costs, and avoids invading privacy such as when screeners open and inspect bags, backpacks, and luggage.
Risk Analysis of Blockchain Application for Aerospace Records Management2019-01-13443/19/2019
Blockchain as a technology has been successfully deployed in the financial industry. As the technology continues to mature, there are opportunities to use this to solve operational challenges in Aerospace. One of the common use cases is replacing paper records as a proof of compliance with a blockchain enabled distributed ledger. Commonly available open source blockchain frameworks have security ingrained in the components. However, replacing paper records with a blockchain based distributed ledger will require investigation of potential risks involved in the end to end usage of this technology for records management. The objective of this paper is to elucidate potential risks in an aviation record management workflow environment enabled by blockchain and suggest requirements to mitigate the risks. In addition requirements for Blockchain based systems will be proposed, which will guarantee minimum functional requirements like Protection of confidential information Integrity of the information in a record Safeguards against unauthorized access The potential gaps are understood using an illustrative end to end blockchain based process along with their conceptual high level intermediate steps. For example: Authenticated trusted digital identities of the participants whose transactions are recorded in distributed ledgers Trusted source which distributes these identities and has a mechanism to update, revoke and safely secure these identities Trusted methods to ensure detection if the digital identities are compromised Trusted method to demonstrate controlled authorization process for digital identities as per access control rules Trusted methods to demonstrate the generation of accounting logs
Kar, Satyanarayan, Kasimsetty, Vinay, Barlow, Susan, Rao, Sujay
Experiences of Civil Certification of Multi-Core Processing Systems in Commercial and Military Avionics, Integration Activities, and Analysis2019-01-13823/19/2019
Avionics systems are currently undergoing a transition from single core processor architectures to multi-core processor architectures. This transition enables significant advantages in reduction in size, weight, power (SWaP) and cost. However, avionics hardware and software certification policies and guidance are evolving as research and experience is gained with multi-core processor architectures. The unique challenges of using multi-core processors in certified avionics will be discussed. The requirements for a virtualization platform supporting multiple real-time operating system (RTOS) partitions on a multi-core processor used in safety-critical avionics systems are defined, including the ability to support multiple design assurance levels (DAL) on multiple cores, fault isolation and containment, static configuration as per ARINC 653, role-based development as per DO-297, and robust partitioning to reduce cost of incremental certification. The paper will present a collaborative approach undertaken by a leading avionics system supplier and a leading safety-critical commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) RTOS supplier in the development of a multi-core real-time system with DO-178C DAL A software and DO-254 DAL A hardware safety certification on an FAA Program of Record (PoR). The approach taken to comply with FAA CAST-32A objectives will be presented. Particular focus is provided for integration activities and program specific analysis performed by the IMA application developer and integrator to guarantee determinism in the deployed system. Using the approach defined under the PoR, the application developer performs activities including foot-printing under worst-case execution time (WCET) loads and application of numerical methods to predict interference effects. The IMA integrator uses this data to define a performance restricted environment (PRE) and uses WCET verification in the PRE. Tools, analysis methods, and sample results will be presented. The method to capture results is discussed. Finally the paper includes lessons learned during the program.
Tiedeman, Harold Glenn, Parkinson, Paul
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